The featured image for this article is GB Class Garratt Locomotive 4-8-2+2-8-4 which entered service in 1948. [1: p307]

During WW2, the financial position of the railways in Tanganyika improved considerably, due in no small part to movements of troops and refugees and a significant increase in goods traffic. In 1940, the number of journeys made by passengers was 511,809 which produced a revenue of £93,478. In 1945, the number of journeys made by passengers was 1,524,087 which produced revenue of £345,650. Throughout the system there was a shortage of passenger rolling-stock and many third-class passengers were carried in goods wagons. Goods traffic amounted to 236,512 tons in 1940 and 357,359 in 1945. The revenue derived from it increased from £469,228 to £638,536. made by passengers was 511,809 which produced a revenue of £93,478. In 1945, the number of journeys made by passengers was 1,524,087 which produced revenue of £345,650. Throughout the system there was a shortage of passenger rolling-stock and many third-class passengers were carried in goods wagons. Goods traffic amounted to 236,512 tons in 1940 and 357,359 in 1945. The revenue derived from it increased from £469,228 to £638,536.

German enterprise in Tanganyika had been allowed to proceed unchecked in the years prior to WW2, but at the advent of the war, all enemy aliens were interned and as a result the ‘Custodian of Enemy Property’ had to deal with “36 sisal estates, 180 coffee estates, 29 tea estates, 231 mixed farms and 14 cocoa-nut plantations, a total of 490 agricultural properties. In addition, there were 91 German-owned businesses and 49 German-owned mining properties in the Territory. German-owned sisal estates accounted for nearly one-third of the Territory’s production, and 24 of them were leased, on a royalty basis, to tenants approved by the Tanganyika Sisal Growers’ Association. In 1938, the German-owned coffee estates had produced 2,000 tons out of a total output of 5,000 tons from European-owned estates. They were nearly all in the Moshi, Arusha, Oldeani and Mbosi districts. The disorganisation of the world’s markets made it very difficult to lease the coffee estates, and only 30 out of the total of 226 had been leased by the end of 1940. The 29 German tea estates in the Southern Highlands, 24 around Mufindi and 5 around Tukuyu, were leased to the Kenya Tea Company, a subsidiary of Brooke Bond. Altogether the Custodian took over 1,739 personal accounts and 720 business and estate accounts. In the first year of the war-i.e. up to 31st August 1940 – the total of estate receipts was £460,632 and of payments £250,278.” [1: p255]

Hill continues:

“For farmers and planters 1940 was a good year, despite the the difficulties imposed by the war, the limitations of overseas markets for certain types of produce and the restriction of shipping, especially for sisal. The production of sisal was 101,810 tons, compared with 103,248 tons in 1939, but only 78,528 tons, valued at £1.5 million, could be exported. In 1939, 93,110 tons valued at £1,223,477 were exported. At the end of 1940 stocks of of sisal unshipped amounted to 46,566 tons compared with a normal stock of 13,000 tons. Exports of coffee and cotton were surprisingly well maintaimed, but the groundnuts crop was only 8,185 tons as compared with exports exceeding 23,000 tons in 1936 and 1937. The production of gold amounted to 291.511 ozs., valued at £1,213,334, of which 36,809 ozs., valued at ₤309,196, were produced by the Geita Gold Mining Company. The output of diamonds (6,211 carats) was valued at £13,614

“The total volume of Tanganyika’s trade in 1940 was very satisfactory and second only to 1937. For the first time the value of domestic exports exceeded £5 million. although a considerable part of the total production could not be exported during the year. The import trade was greatly reduced by the difficulty of securing supplies, the cessation of building and development, and the removal of German consumers. The favourable balance of visible trade rose to £2,640,000. Despite the difficulties, local trading conditions were sound and much of the trade was on a cash basis. The absence of the former competition of German merchant firms was an aid to traders in adjusting their operations to wartime conditions. In the July of 1940 the Compulsory Service Ordinance introduced conscription for all British subjects and protected persons. By the end of the year, nearly all adult male Europeans who were not in the Forces were either employed in essential occupations or were too old for military service. On 14th June 1941, 450 Europeans, 330 Asians and 17,500 Africans were on military service with the East Africa Command.

“By the end of 1940 the scope of the control of essential supplies was extended to include general supplies. The General Manager of the Railways was responsible both for the control of supplies and for the operation of price control. By means of an import control, the imports of non-sterling goods were reduced to £1,135,462 in 1940 as compared with over £1.8 million in 1938.

“Early in 1940 the Sisal Controller, Major Sir William Lead, visited London to discuss the problems confronting the industry. The requirements of the United Kingdom and France were about 80,000 tons a year, and the rest of East Africa’s output was very hard to sell. With the collapse of France, the Continental markets were closed, and it was essential to devise a scheme for the restriction of output. The British Government agreed to guarantee a market for 100,000 tons of East African sisal during the year 1940-1941 at a controlled price, and the sisal planters agreed to restrict production by one-third. The restriction scheme, which came into operation on 1st November 1940, provided a quota of 76,570 tons of sisal from Tanganyika and 23,430 tons from Kenya and Uganda. The restriction scheme did not last for long. Within a year the maximum output of sisal was required and steps were taken to raise production to 108,000 tons a year.

“Towards the end of 1940 the East Africa Command called on Tanganyika for a rapid increase in supplies of meat, rice, onions and potatoes to the Army. In September a timber control was established on an East African basis under Major F. W. Cavendish-Bentinck, who was represented in Tanganyika by the Conservator of Forests as Deputy Controller. By the end of the year all sawmills were working at full capacity to meet military orders. The Shume concession of the Tanganyika Forests and Lumber Company was terminated in September, and the land, buildings and machinery were requisitioned. The forest was then worked by a South African Forestry Company, a military unit, until the April of 1941, when the Shume sawmill was closed down.

“By the end of 1940 Tanganyika’s General Revenue Balance was £705,984, a result which confounded the pundits and showed how rash it is to predict the economic reaction to a set of unprecedented conditions.

“In 1941 the revenue of the railways and the ports increased to £841,616, whereas expenditure was held down to £431,928, a remarkable achievement. After payment of loan charges (£313,137), the railways were left with a surplus of £96,551, the largest since 1927. The liability of the railways to the Government of Tanganyika was reduced to £299,096, which included a sum of £55,000 to cover the holding of Government stores. The Acting General Manager, Mr. L. E. Steventon, reported that the number of miles run per engine failure was again disappointing. ‘The majority of failures,’ he wrote, ‘were caused by the inexperience of young African drivers who are being employed as a result of heavy wastage of older men. Difficulty is being experienced in obtaining the right type of learner-driver and also in retaining their services after training has started. Training of African drivers and artisans has continued as satisfactorily as can be expected under present difficult conditions.’ A number of these drivers who remained in the Railways’ service later proved very satisfactory.

“Mr. Steventon also reported that the track had been maintained to a standard which permitted good running at the maximum speed in force. There were some bad sections in the Dodoma district, but on the coastal sections running was improved by the laying of earth ballast. One of the solutions to the problem of carrying more traffic without an increase of engine power was to regrade or realign the more steeply graded sections of the line. … In 1944, realignment and regrading was started between Morogoro and Mkata to reduce the gradient to 1%, compensated for curvature, and this work was completed in 1946. Regrading at Kidete and Saranda was also undertaken and completed in 1944. The increased traffic of the war years also made it necessary to restart the ballasting of many sections of the main line, although the demands on rolling stock often made it difficult to move the ballast from the quarries to the line.

“In the January, November and December of 1941 there were serious washaways in the Dodoma district, especially between Kms. 473 and 489, around Manyoni and in the Mukandokwa valley, which caused serious delays to traffic. As a result of a wash-away in January, a new bridge was built at Km. 473. It was completed in November, a few days before the temporary diversion was washed away. In addition to coping with its own problems, the Engineering Department also undertook the construction of an internment camp to house 3,000 men at Tabora. The camp, built in four months, was needed to house Italian enemy subjects removed from Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. In the following year, a similar camp was built at Kigoma.” [1: p255-257]

“Towards the end of 1940, the East Africa Command called on Tanganyika for a rapid increase in supplies of meat, rice, onions and potatoes to the Army. In September a timber control was established on an East African basis under Major F. W. Caven-dish-Bentinck, who was represented in Tanganyika by the Conservator of Forests as Deputy Controller. By the end of the year all sawmills were working at full capacity to meet military orders. The Shume concession of the Tanganyika Forests and Lumber Company was terminated in September, and the land, buildings and machinery were requisitioned. The forest was then worked by a South African Forestry Company, a military unit, until the April of 1941, when the Shume sawmill was closed down.

“By the end of 1940, Tanganyika’s General Revenue Balance was £705,984, a result which confounded the pundits and showed how rash it is to predict the economic reaction to a set of unprecedented conditions.

“In 1941 the revenue of the railways and the ports increased to £841,616, whereas expenditure was held down to £431,928, a remarkable achievement. After payment of loan charges (£313,137), the railways were left with a surplus of £96,551, the largest since 1927. The liability of the railways to the Government of Tanganyika was reduced to £299,096, which included a sum of £55,000 to cover the holding of Government stores. The Acting General Manager, Mr. L. E. Steventon, reported that the number of miles run per engine failure was again disappointing. ‘The majority of failures,’ he wrote, ‘were caused by the inexperience of young African drivers who are being employed as a result of heavy wastage of older men. Difficulty is being experienced in obtaining the right type of learner-driver and also in retaining their services after training has started. Training of African drivers and artisans has continued as satisfactorily as can be expected under present difficult conditions.’ A number of these drivers who remained in the Railways’ service later proved very satisfactory.

“Mr. Steventon also reported that the track had been maintained to a standard which permitted good running at the maximum speed in force. There were some bad sections in the Dodoma district, but on the coastal sections running was improved by the laying of earth ballast. One of the solutions to the problem of carrying more traffic without an increase of engine power was to regrade or realign the more steeply graded sections of the line. … In 1944, realignment and regrading was started between Morogoro and Mkata to reduce the gradient to 1%, compensated for curvature, and this work was completed in 1946. Regrading at Kidete and Saranda was also undertaken and completed in 1944. The increased traffic of the war years also made it necessary to restart the ballasting of many sections of the main line, although the demands on rolling stock often made it difficult to move the ballast from the quarries to the line.

“In the January, November and December of 1941 there were serious washaways in the Dodoma district, especially between Kms. 473 and 489, around Manyoni and in the Mukandokwa valley, which caused serious delays to traffic. As a result of a wash-away in January, a new bridge was built at Km. 473. It was completed in November, a few days before the temporary diversion was washed away. In addition to coping with its own problems, the Engineering Department also undertook the construction of an internment camp to house 3,000 men at Tabora. The camp, built in four months, was needed to house Italian enemy subjects removed from Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland. In the following year, a similar camp was built at Kigoma.” [1: p255-257]

From 1942 until the amalgamation with Kenya and Uganda Railways in May 1948, the Tanganyika Railways made substantial profits. Hill tells us that:

“For the year 1942 the gross revenue of the railways and the ports was £1,115,927, while expenditure was only £504,642. After paying loan charges, the working profit was £296,009. At long last it was possible to inaugurate a proper Renewals Fund, and it was opened with an appropriation of £100,000. The liability to the Tanganyika Government was reduced to £84,509. The railways’ profits for the rest of the war years were £267,122 in 1943, £276,332 in 1944 and £225,441 in 1945. These satisfactory results enabled allocations to the Renewals Fund of £220,000 in 1943, £237,150 in 1944, and £193,900 in 1945. Of the allocation in 1942, £20,000 was specifically ear-marked for the new road services. Although it was not possible to place the Renewals Fund on an economic basis, it was realised that unless full renewals’ contributions were made in respect of the road vehicles which had a high value and a short life, the road services would soon be in serious financial difficulties.

“In 1944. the financial position of the ports had so improved that it was possible to contribute £10,000 to a Ports Renewals Fund, in addition to contributions of £200,000 to the Railways’ Renewals Fund and of £27,500 to the Road Services’ Renewals Fund. In 1945, the contribution to the Railways’ Renewals Fund had to be reduced to £150,000, but the contribution in respect of the ports was maintained at £10,000, and the allocation to the Road Services’ Renewals Fund was increased to £35,900. This was an important step towards a sounder financial position, but there was still a deal of leeway to be made up. In 1940, the General Manager had stated that the arrears of renewals, in respect of British assets alone, amounted to £1,272,782,

“The improvement in the railways’ financial position during the war years was based on a much wider range of traffic than formerly. The traffic returns for 1945 showed that no single item provided a dangerously large percentage of the revenue as had been the case in the years when copper had been the mainstay of the Central line. During the war the Congo traffic increased substantially, but in 1945 it represented only 159,278 of a total revenue of nearly £1.5 million.

“When the finances of the ports were separated from those of the railways in 1939, the gross earnings amounted to £123,075, the expenditure to £96,658, including debt charges, and the excess of earnings over expenditure was £26,517. These results remained much the same during the next two years, but in 1942 they started to improve, and by 1945 the gross earnings had reached a figure of £214,297. Expenditure, including debt charges, was £159,183, and the excess of earnings over expenditure was £55,114. The substantial growth of traffic strained the ports in the same way as the railways. Unfortunately the ports had also to cope with the difficulties caused by the convoy system. The arrival of ships in bunches made smooth working at Dar-es-Salaam difficult and threw a great strain on the storage accommodation at the port. As shippers had no knowledge of the arrivals and sailings of vessels, far more exports had to be stored in the port area than was normal, so a low storage rate was introduced. In 1944, at Dar-es-Salaam Malindi Wharf, a new shed which provided an additional 13,000 square feet of storage space, was constructed.

“In 1941, it was decided that the arrangements under which the Tanganyika Landing and Shipping Company, the Administration’s cargo-handling contractors at the ports, were working gave too favourable terms to the contractors. A new agreement was therefore reached whereby all revenue accruing from the handling of cargo was paid to the Tanganyika Railways, and the Tanganyika Landing and Shipping Company was paid on the basis of the actual cost of the work which they performed, plus a percentage for profit. The new agreement came into force on 1st January 1942, and resulted in a substantial increase of the gross earnings of the ports of Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga. The net receipts increased from £24,080 in 1941 to £48,251 in 1942.” [1: p258-259]

“For the year 1942 the gross revenue of the railways and the ports was £1,115,927, while expenditure was only £504,642. After paying loan charges, the working profit was £296,009. At long last it was possible to inaugurate a proper Renewals Fund, and it was opened with an appropriation of £100,000. The liability to the Tanganyika Government was reduced to £84,509. The railways’ profits for the rest of the war years were £267,122 in 1943, £276,332 in 1944 and £225,441 in 1945. These satisfactory results enabled allocations to the Renewals Fund of £220,000 in 1943, £237,150 in 1944, and £193,900 in 1945. Of the allocation in 1942, £20,000 was specifically ear-marked for the new road services. Although it was not possible to place the Renewals Fund on an economic basis, it was realised that unless full renewals’ contributions were made in respect of the road vehicles which had a high value and a short life, the road services would soon be in serious financial difficulties.

“In 1944. the financial position of the ports had so improved that it was possible to contribute £10,000 to a Ports Renewals Fund, in addition to contributions of £200,000 to the Railways’ Renewals Fund and of £27,500 to the Road Services’ Renewals Fund. In 1945, the contribution to the Railways’ Renewals Fund had to be reduced to £150,000, but the contribution in respect of the ports was maintained at £10,000, and the allocation to the Road Services’ Renewals Fund was increased to £35,900. This was an important step towards a sounder financial position, but there was still a deal of leeway to be made up. In 1940, the General Manager had stated that the arrears of renewals, in respect of British assets alone, amounted to £1,272,782,

“The improvement in the railways’ financial position during the war years was based on a much wider range of traffic than formerly. The traffic returns for 1945 showed that no single item provided a dangerously large percentage of the revenue as had been the case in the years when copper had been the mainstay of the Central line. During the war the Congo traffic increased substantially, but in 1945 it represented only 159,278 of a total revenue of nearly £1.5 million.

“When the finances of the ports were separated from those of the railways in 1939, the gross earnings amounted to £123,075, the expenditure to £96,658, including debt charges, and the excess of earnings over expenditure was £26,517. These results remained much the same during the next two years, but in 1942 they started to improve, and by 1945 the gross earnings had reached a figure of £214,297. Expenditure, including debt charges, was £159,183, and the excess of earnings over expenditure was £55,114. The substantial growth of traffic strained the ports in the same way as the railways. Unfortunately the ports had also to cope with the difficulties caused by the convoy system. The arrival of ships in bunches made smooth working at Dar-es-Salaam difficult and threw a great strain on the storage accommodation at the port. As shippers had no knowledge of the arrivals and sailings of vessels, far more exports had to be stored in the port area than was normal, so a low storage rate was introduced. In 1944, at Dar-es-Salaam Malindi Wharf, a new shed which provided an additional 13,000 square feet of storage space, was constructed.

“In 1941, it was decided that the arrangements under which the Tanganyika Landing and Shipping Company, the Administration’s cargo-handling contractors at the ports, were working gave too favourable terms to the contractors. A new agreement was therefore reached whereby all revenue accruing from the handling of cargo was paid to the Tanganyika Railways, and the Tanganyika Landing and Shipping Company was paid on the basis of the actual cost of the work which they performed, plus a percentage for profit. The new agreement came into force on 1st January 1942, and resulted in a substantial increase of the gross earnings of the ports of Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga. The net receipts increased from £24,080 in 1941 to £48,251 in 1942.” [1: p258-259]

In 1942, a service of first class safari cars which seated 7 passengers, and were built on a 10-cwt. chassis, was introduced between Morogoro and Korogwe. The fares charged were double the normal second class fare on the ordinary bus. In 1943, very heavy demands were made on this service for the carriage of passengers, including troops. As a result, it was necessary to divert all ordinary goods traffic to the sea route between Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam and to carry only passengers and baggage by road.

Hill explains that the Morogoro Road Service brought in some considerable revenue. The Railway’s profits from the venture, after payment of interest, loan charges and renewals contributions, were:

1941 ………. £3,107; 1942 …………. £271; 1943 …….. £17,950; 1944 ………. £6,311; 1945 ………. £9,199

The result of this was that the Government asked the Railways to run further road services. [2][3] Hill describes the growth of road service during WW2 as remarkable and he provides figures to support his assertion:

More details about the road services provided by Tanganyika Railways and the later East Africa Railways and Harbours can be found here. [2]

The railways were also expected to expand their services on water, both at the coast and inland. In 1942, a river service was set up in the Kilombero valley at the Governments assistance. This was a loss making service which ran for just three years before it was closed. In 1940, a ferry service to local ports and islands based at Mwanza was started which was based on vessels leased from the Custodian of Enemy Property.

By 1944, Hill tells us that: The policymakers of Tanganyika Railways were beginning to envisage what life might be like in the coming peace. “Between the two world wars Tanganyika’s status as a mandated territory under the League of Nations was undoubtedly a hindrance to economic development. As the repute of the League of Nations waned, fear that Tanganyika would be restored to Germany had waxed. As a result, capital investment was small and few commercial concerns were prepared to accept the political risk in addition to the hazards common to enterprise in an undeveloped country. These political fears and a policy of undue caution and, at least to some extent, of restriction, retarded the development of agriculture and curtailed the alienation of land for European settlement between the two world wars.” [1: p261]By 1944, Hill tells us that:

Hill continues:

“In the May of 1944 Mr. J. R. Farquharson, the Chief Engineer of the Tanganyika Railways who had been seconded as Controller of Road Transport, completed an able review of transport in Tanganyika. Mr. Farquharson’s main conclusions and recommendations were:

(i) A Transport Authority should be established to operate all state transport services, to undertake the licensing, regulation and supervision of other internal transport services, and to negotiate with transport operators between Tanganyika and other countries.

(ii) Railway revenue from internal traffic could be estimated as increasing by £15,000 a year from a level of £610,000 in 1941. A new agreement should be negotiated in respect of transit traffic to and from the Belgian Congo, To be rid of injustices to Tanganyika, a new agreement should be negotiated in respect of traffic between the Northern and Lake Provinces and the coast.

(iii) The annual cost of maintaining Tanganyika’s roads was £150,000 and the revenue raised from road users was less than £100,000. The usual unit was a vehicle of three tons’ capacity. The road transport industry was in the hands of ‘small’ men, usually owning from one to three lorries. The real cost of operating lorries was 70 cents per vehicle-mile.

(iv) The future of road-rail relations was the main transport problem. The disparity in marginal costs of rail and motor transport was about 2 cents and 20 to 30 cents respectively. Control should be exercised over road routes parallel to railway lines, but free competition should be allowed within de-fined traffic areas.

(v) A new railway should be built, at an estimated cost of £900,000, between Morogoro on the Central line and Korogwe on the Tanga line. Another new railway should be built, at an estimated cost of £2,400,000, between Morogoro and Mbeya, with the possibility in mind of stopping at a point beyond Ifakara.

(“Mr. Farquharson then wrote: ‘The financing of the losses on these two railways in their early years is well within the capacity of the railway services but, in the interests of the general welfare, it might be desirable to finance the losses in whole or in part from general revenue. Future investment in the road system should be the subject of further consideration by the proposed Transport Authority in the light of decisions made regarding railway developments. The proposed railway links, apart from their beneficial effect on the local economy, will be of great value for defence purposes and will greatly assist in the development of an African economy. All railway, port and other engineering works should be planned as a continuous programme, so that the best use is made of personnel and equipment, and the level of activity is suited to the needs of Tanganyika’s economy’.”) [1: p261-262]

Farquharson’s list continues:

“(vi) While the Shipping Conferences served a most useful function for overseas traffic, their control over local movements on the East African coast and their use of the deferred rebate system in respect of local shipments had been contrary to the welfare of Tanganyika. Deferred rebates should be prohibited and the Transport Authority should operate two coastal steamers.

(vii) Two deep-water berths should be constructed at Dar es Salaam at an estimated capital cost of £400,000. One deep-water berth and one coastal berth should be built at Tanga at an estimated cost of £300,000. Coastal berths should also be built at Lindi and Mikindani. The annual charges on a capital expenditure of some £800,000 could be met without difficulty from the revenue of the ports.

(viii) A motor-launch service should be operated along the Tanganyika shore of Lake Nyasa and much improved services established on Victoria Nyanza.

(ix) Internal air services should be co-ordinated with other internal transport services and operated in the interests of East Africa rather than to suit the convenience of operators on international routes.” [1: p262-263]

Farquharson also drew attention to a ‘Memorandum on the financial and economic aspects of the transport facilities serving the Lake Province of Tanganyika’, which was dated November 1940. Hill quotes the last two paragraphs of that memorandum which read:

“Finally it may be argued that amalgamation of the three East African territories or amalgamation of the two East African railways or both would settle the question raised in this memorandum; from that premise it could be reasoned that there would be little point in reaching a settlement on this particular problem if one of the amalgamations mentioned is likely to take place at some not-too-distant date. Amalgamation, per se, would not really solve the difficulties, and in fact a proper appreciation of this frontier problem is required to ensure that, if the railways are amalgamated, all parties will receive equitable treatment. The consideration given to all the factors and the solution proposed in this memorandum would, in fact, assist greatly in any later negotiations regarding closer union. Amalgamation may take a number of forms: e.g. (i) complete union of territories and the railways (as in South Africa); (ii) federation of territories with separate state railways (as in Australia); (iii) federation with amalgamation of the rail system; (iv) amalgamation of railways with separate states (as in Kenya and Uganda at present). With the first solution it would be necessary to consider the East African railways as a homogeneous transport system and apply the same rate structure throughout. If the union took place with no change in total traffic, the new rate level would be generally higher than the present Kenya-Uganda-rate level. It could be argued that this would be caused by the amalgamation with a low-traffic, high-cost line, but principally it would show that the present low Kenya-Uganda rates had been obtained partly because of the traffic to and from the Northern and Lake Provinces of Tanganyika. With the second solution each territory would give to the federal body only certain of its rights as a separate political entity, and with separate railway systems it would still be necessary to negotiate equitable agreements as between the federal authority, the separate territories and the railways. With the third solution it would also be necessary to negotiate equitable agreements between the railway system, the states and the federal authorities. With the fourth solution it would still be necessary for the separate terri tories to have equitable arrangements with the single administration, otherwise the latter would have the power to affect state policies.

“It can be seen, therefore, that no matter what the future may hold as regards the development of the East African transport administrations, nothing is gained by any postponement in considering the question raised in this memorandum. For forty years the Kenya-Uganda system has enjoyed almost all the transport revenue from one of the richest parts of the Territory, though the Territory itself has had its own transport route available since 1928; a settlement is now required which will safeguard the interests of Tanganyika and its inhabitants after the termination of the existing agreement.” [1: p263-264]

Hill mentions that “At long last, a decision was taken to cut the annual losses on the branch line from Manyoni to Kinyangiri. The section from Singida to Kinyangiri was taken up in 1944 and a triangle installed at Singida. In 1947 the section from Manyoni to Singida was also taken up and an unfortunate venture finally closed.” [1: p264]

Hill goes on to state that:

During 1944, orders were placed in the United Kingdom for a number of new covered wagons and tank cars, but by the end of 1947 only 22 new covered wagons had been delivered. Apart from a few shunting engines, no new engines nor passenger coaches were ordered, and the existing stock proved sufficient to cope with the traffic offering until 1947. In that year there was a decline in the volume of passenger traffic.

In 1945, there were eleven washaways on the Central line, and one of them was a serious blow. Near Mikese, one of the three Garratt engines was wrecked beyond repair and had to be written off, eight wagons were derailed and seriously damaged, and the line was blocked for four days. … In the same year Mr. A. E. Hamp, after thirty-three years of notable service to East Africa, retired as General Manager of the Tanganyika Railways and was succeeded by Mr. J. R. Farquharson. At the conclusion of his Annual Report for the year 1945, Mr. Farquharson wrote:

“It may be that the volumes of passenger and goods traffic of 1945 will not be exceeded for many years. Passenger traffic by rail rose from 35 million passenger miles in 1939 to 136 million in 1945. Public goods traffic rose from 45 million ton-miles in 1939 to 81 million in 1945. These services can look with pride on the part they have played in carrying, without any increase in rolling stock, the burdens which have resulted from the war.

“At the end of the year traffic was still rising, but the completion of demobilisation in 1946 will result in some diminution of the passenger traffic. In this period of rapid change it is difficult to forecast the position of the services during the next few years. It is hoped that, though revenues may fall, it will be possible to adjust working expenditure to such an extent as will enable a healthy net revenue position to be maintained. If this can be done, the capital investment so necessary to enable these services to play a full part in the development of the Territory can safely be undertaken.”

“In 1944, Sir Reginald Robins, the General Manager of the Kenya and Uganda Railways, had predicted that peace would bring “a considerable diminution of the demands made on the railways and a consequent fall in the revenue.” In his Annual Report for the year 1946, Sir Reginald wrote: “Few, if any, of those connected with business and shipping could foresee the amazing recovery in the import of goods from overseas. It was remarkable how quickly the momentum of the United Kingdom’s export drive gathered speed, and even more remarkable how ships in such numbers were diverted, on the completion of their tasks of carrying troops from overseas theatres of war, to cargo services.”

“The predictions of the two General Managers were wide of the mark, although they were in accord with the majority of well-informed opinion at the time. Perhaps there was too great a tendency to think in terms of 1919, and to under-estimate the release of spending power in search of goods which followed six years of war. In the case of Tanganyika, Mr. Farquharson could not foresee, at the time, the tremendous demands which the East African Groundnuts Scheme would impose on the railways.

“In the December of 1945, a non-Parliamentary paper on Inter-Territorial Reorganisation in East Africa proposed inter alia, a complete amalgamation of the Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours with the Tanganyika Railways and Ports Services, and the establishment of a Railways and Ports Advisory Board for the combined services. Unfortunately, the political implications of the paper provoked a controversy which distracted public attention from the proposals concerning the railways and harbours. It was unfortunate that these issues were virtually ignored in a contentious political argument, for there is no doubt that the paper offered a logical solution of many persistent problems. In the upshot the amalgamation of the two transport systems was postponed for more than two years.

“During 1946 there was a small decrease of first-class travel on the Tanganyika Railways, but an increase of third-class travel, caused mainly by the large number of troops carried after demobilisation, a movement completed in July, and the carriage of 5,600 members of the Ismailia community to Dar es Salaam during July and August to attend the Jubilee celebrations of H.H. the Aga Khan. The goods traffic increased, from 357.359 tons in 1945 to 373,823 tons in 1946. Financially the railways did very much better than during the last year of the war, and the net profit of £310,984 was the highest yet recorded and enabled £203,060 to be allocated to the Renewals Funds. For the time being, the passenger traffic passed its peak in 1946, but there was to be a further rapid increase from 1948 onwards. There was no check to the mounting volume of goods traffic for several years ahead.

“In his Annual Report for 1946, Mr. Farquharson wrote: “There are indications that goods traffic had reached or was approaching a post-war peak, but the decision of His Majesty’s Government to proceed with the Groundnuts Scheme in areas served by the existing lines has completely altered the traffic prospects during the next few years. The estimated traffic for the areas exceeds the capacity of the existing goods wagons and arrangements are in train to obtain second-hand stock from military sources and to procure supplies of new stock from the United Kingdom. Until these additional wagons are available, congestion will occur on the Central line.” [1: p264-266]

Hill continues:

“In the June of 1946 the Charter of the United Nations was adopted by the Security Conference held in San Francisco. Article 75 of the Charter stated:

“The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed there-under by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereafter referred to as Trust Territories.” [1: p266]

Article 77 stated:

“1. The trusteeship systems shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

(a) Territories now held under mandate.

(b) Territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and

(c) Territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

“2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.” [1: p266]

By an Agreement with the United Nations His Majesty’s Government undertook to administer Tanganyika as a Trust Territory. The Agreement required that the Territory should be administered for the benefit of all sections of the population, irrespective of race or religion. The terms of the Agreement [could not] be changed without the consent of the Government of the United Kingdom. The recognition that the British Government intended to administer Tanganyika until the ultimate goal of self-government be reached, and that the rights and interests of all communities would be secured and protected, led to a greater measure of confidence in the political future and a consequent increase of capital investment.

Hill continues:

“For some years before the war consideration had been given to a long-range development programme. In December 1937, a Central Development Committee was appointed to examine and report on methods whereby development by native and non-native enterprise could best be encouraged and assisted. The outbreak of war interrupted the Committee’s work, but its admirable report, for which Sir George Sandford was largely responsible, was published in 1940. … During the war it was impossible to implement many of the Development Committee’s recommendations, but towards the end of 1943 a programme of post-war planning was drafted. A special development branch was set up in the Secretariat to re-examine, in collaboration with a Planning Committee, the position in the light of the changed conditions and circumstances. At the end of 1944 a memorandum entitled ‘An Outline of Post-War Development Proposals’ was published. The programme outlined in this memorandum was designed as the framework within which development should be carried out and not as a complete plan in itself. In 1946 it was decided that the planning and direction of development should no longer be regarded as part of the Secretariat’s functions and that the responsibility should be transferred to a separate organisation which could pay undivided attention to them. A Development Commission was, therefore, appointed. In September 1946, the report of the Commission, setting forth a ten-year development and welfare plan for the Territory, was published. It was approved by His Majesty’s Government in January 1947, subject to the provision of additional funds for African education and to the setting up of machinery to provide financial assistance for African farmers. The estimated cost of the plan was £19,186,000. The urgent need for the improvement of Tanganyika’s road system was recognised, and over £3.5 million was allocated for the realignment and reconstruction of certain main roads to bitumen standard and for the improvement of subsidiary roads. The ill-fated East African Groundnuts Scheme had its origin in a world shortage of edible oils and fats which seemed likely to continue for a long time. Proposals for such a scheme were first considered by His Majesty’s Government early in 1946. After a thorough investigation and a most optimistic report which paid inadequate heed to several vital factors, including the notorious variation in the yield of the groundnut crop along the Central line, the scheme was approved. It was proposed, within a few years, to bring into cultivation over 3,000,000 acres of land in Tanganyika, Kenya and Northern Rhodesia. Nearly 80 per cent. of the total acreage projected was to be in Tanganyika. The first areas to be developed, at Kongwa and Urambo, were served by the Central line, but by far the largest area planned was in the Southern Province. This entailed the building of a new railway and a new port equipped with deep-water berths.” [1: p266-268]

For more about the Southern Line and the Groundnuts Scheme, please click here [4] and here. [Part 12]

The railways also sought to provide effective transport for minerals extracted across the country:

• Mwadui Mine (Williamson’s Diamonds Ltd) – in 1947, a 9 mile ‘siding’ was provided from the Mwanza Branch to serve the Mwadui Mine.
• Mpanda (Uruwira Minerals Ltd) – a branch line from Kaliua on the Central Line to Mpanda was opened in August 1950.

“During the years 1946 to 1948, the road services continued to operate under very difficult conditions, with inadequate workshop facilities and an unsuitable fleet of vehicles. Many of the lorries had been bought during the war, and they were worked hard without thought of a long life. Early in 1948, the Road Services’ fleet of vehicles consisted of 250 assorted units, but many had been fully depreciated and were waiting their turn to be scrapped. Nevertheless, the mounting volume of traffic was carried, rates were kept at a reasonable level and the revenue earned by the Road Services steadily increased. In 1947, the surplus, after repayment of loan charges, was £23.303. but it was becoming clear that the provision for renewals (£27.450 in 1947) was inadequate. Orders were placed for large diesel-engined units which later became the mainstay of the freight service by road.” [1: p270]

“During 1947, a new passenger road service was started between Arusha and Dodoma, a passenger and goods service was started between Arusha and Oldeani, and when the Singida line was closed, it was replaced by a road service between Singida and Itigi. … It was decided in 1946 that the railway should run its own catering services. Previously the catering in the dining cars had been undertaken by contractors and the railway’s hotels at Dodoma and Tabora had beenleased to private concerns. In May the hotel at Dodoma was taken over and completely rebuilt to cope with the passenger traffic which had been greatly increased by the road service.” [1: p270-271]

Hill continues:

“Between the May and November of 1947 six new M.L. 2-8-2 engines arrived from the United Kingdom. Although they were adequate to meet immediate needs, it was clear that more engines would be needed to meet the estimated volume of traffic in 1948 and 1949. There was no prospect of obtaining new engines in under three years. Again a widespread search was made for metre-gauge engines which were for sale. Four new Garratt locomotives, suitable for operation on the Central line, were found at Rangoon and bought from the War Office. They arrived at Dar-es-Salaam in the May of 1948 and gave excellent service. Sixteen American-built ‘MacArthur’ engines were also bought from the Malayan Railway, which was then taking delivery of new engines from the United Kingdom.

“After some delay the first shipment of eight ‘MacArthur’ engines was received late in 1948. One was erected to ensure that they were capable of giving satisfactory service. The trial was sufficiently encouraging to warrant confirmation of the order for the remaining eight engines. It was first planned to erect these engines as they were needed, as the 430 wagons obtained from Shaiba and El Shatt came into service and as additional staff was available. Later it was decided to provide a margin of engine power more quickly and an erecting team was flown from Nairobi to tackle the task of erection.

“These ‘MacArthur’ engines were supposed to be of the same American design, but they had been manufactured by three different firms and each had changed certain details of the design. Generally, they were a rough war-time production. The construction of the tender water-tanks was weak and they had to be rebuilt. The valve-gear and the reversing gear was also re-designed, and most of the new parts were made in Nairobi and fitted in Dar-es-Salaam. Due to the limited capacity of the Dar-es-Salaam workshops, six of the engines were dismantled and brought to Nairobi, where they were completely overhauled and the new parts fitted. The ‘MacArthurs’ were not well suited to burning wood fuel, but after they were converted to oil firing their performance greatly improved. Although built only to meet a war-time need, they have given reasonably good service on the Central line – so much so that they are not due to be scrapped until 1963.

“In addition to the four Garratt and 16 ‘MacArthur’ engines, four engines, built at the Ajmer workshops in India and found lying idle at El Shatt, were bought at a nominal price. They were intended only for secondary and departmental use and as an insurance against delay in the delivery of other units. These four second-hand engines met a limited need and were in use until 1957.

“The tonnage handled at the port of Dar-es-Salaam increased from 270,000 tons in 1945 to over 439,000 tons in 1947 and over 504,000 tons in 1948. The Groundnuts Scheme imposed a very severe strain on the facilities, equipment and staff of the port, although its capacity was considerably increased to cope with the mounting traffic. Heavy cargoes for Kongwa had to be off-loaded over a lighterage wharf. There were not enough lighters, quay space, shed space and stacking grounds and many of the cargoes arriving for the Groundnuts Scheme were awkward to handle. In the upshot much of the equipment, then regarded as an urgent need at Kongwa or Urambo, was never used. A shipment of fertilisers was dumped at the back of the port area and railed up-country over a period. As late as 1952 a large quantity of these fertilisers was still lying unused in the open at Urambo. In addition to the demands of Kongwa and Urambo, normal import traffic increased rapidly during the post-war years and the transit traffic to the Belgian Congo was also heavy.

“Despite all the difficulties, the Tanganyika Railways earned a record profit in 1947. The combined earnings of the railways and the ports were £1,883,996. Expenditure was £1,252,289. After paying loan charges of £307,214, the net profit was £318,493 and allocations to the Renewals Funds were £287,450. The liability of the railways under the various loans was £4,348,465 and the accumulated sinking fund was £978,533.” [1: p271-272]

In the last 8 to 9 pages of his narrative, Hill tells the story of the final months of the independent existence of Tanganyika Railways and Ports Services. Public opinion became positively disposed to an inter-territorial reorganisation in East Africa. By 1st January 1948 the East Africa High Commission and the East Africa Central Assembly were established.

On 21st April 1948, the General manager of Tanganyika Railways and Ports Services proposed the amalgamation of the Tanganyika Railways and Ports Services with the Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours. In doing so he outlined the advantages and the disadvantages of the proposal. He said:

“In the first place, I would stress … the essential geographic and economic unity in these territories. … Secondly, it appears to me that both inside and outside the Territory the present strength of the finances of the Tanganyika Railways and Ports Services has been underestimated. … Thirdly, I should like to mention briefly the position regarding the lines being built principally in connection with the Overseas Food Corporation. The branch now under construction from Msagali to Kongwa and Hororo is being financed from railway funds with no guarantees from the Corporation. The questions of finance and guarantees in connection with the Port Works at Mikindani and the railway being built from the port to the groundnut areas have recently been discussed with Sir Charles Lockhart, a director of the Corporation. Provisional agreement has been reached in terms which are generally in accord with standards prescribed in the motion which was approved by a neighbouring legislature when considering the question of amalgamation. I would add that though the Groundnuts Scheme has added considerably to the present transport problems, it should be remembered that this big increment of traffic, leading to a spread of fixed costs and hence in the long run to lower rates for other users, has brought long-term benefits which should not be under-estimated.

“Advantages likely to accrue from amalgamation … the application of a uniform rating structure. … The new tariff … will, subject to the qualification that variations may be necessary from other causes, be generally be below the present Tanganyi8ka level. … Of much more fundamental importance … is the gain which will accrue to East Africa as a result of the removal of the break in tapered rates. … [There is an] almost universal policy of tapering goods rates, i.e, as distance increases the charge per mile decreases. With two railway systems in East Africa there is a discontinuity … in the rate at the inter-change point, so that charges for goods passing from one system to the other are generally higher per mile than movements of the same distance over one system. … The internal movement of traffic is certain to increase, and the increasing inter-territorial movements will be greatly facilitated by the uniform tariff. It would in practice be very difficult for two administrations to operate a uniform tariff, as this would in effect prevent either administration from controlling its own revenue.

“The second major advantage of amalgamation is the ability of the larger system to withstand reduction in earnings arising from droughts or from depressions in specific industries. This in turn leads to greater financial stability and consequent capacity to pursue a steady financial policy and to plan development projects farther ahead than would otherwise be possible. This is a matter of great importance if the transport services are to be well planned to meet adequately the needs of East Africa.

“The amalgamation will facilitate the adoption of the rolling stock standards (as regards the dimensions, the form of braking and the type of coupler), the structure gauge and most important the track gauge already agreed for the whole of Southern Africa. The policy of standardisation is being followed now but it will become more effective under one administration. It seems probable, with the developments now envisaged in Africa, that the question of converting the East African lines from metre gauge to 3 feet 6 inches will have to be tackled during the next ten or perhaps twenty years when a junction is effected with the Rhodesian system. The change of gauge will be a fairly lengthy process, will involve a number of temporary diversions in traffic flows and will be greatly facilitated if the lines are under a single direction.” [1: p272-275]

We can plan for but never fully anticipate the future! While the railways were under colonial control many of these arguments hold sway, but considerably less so once the various countries gained their independence. Ultimately, also, the change of gauge was not to occur. The TAZARA carried the 3ft 6 in gauge through to Dar-es-Salaam but no attempt was made to convert the East African network to a common 3ft 6in gauge! Plans in the twenty-first century are for a standard-gauge network rather than a narrow-gauge network.

Farquharson contines:

“The relatively minor advantages of amalgamation may be listed – better designed timetables for passengers, simpler tariffs for users and quicker adjustment of engines and rolling stock to meet changing traffic demands.

“Some possible disadvantages [Include]: … the increase in size of the organisation might produce, at least in the early stages, some reduction in efficiency; … the transport administration might pursue policies as regards its organisation and the quality of its services which were detrimental to Tanganyika.

“In my view the advantages clearly outweigh the disadvantages, but nevertheless it has been considered expedient to specify certain safeguards which should ensure that as far as practicable the possible disadvantages will not be experienced. The Territory will, of course, have through the machinery being set up a substantial voice in the policy to be followed by the unified undertaking. In addition, it is proposed that the unified undertaking should not assume control until the arrangements for, firstly, representation on the various advisory bodies and, secondly, the organisation of the new undertaking (so far as it concerns Tanganyika) have been accepted by the Tanganyika Government. … Joint undertakings of this type may be of three types: firstly, those in which the constituents obtain approximately equal benefits; secondly, those in which the constituents obtain widely varying benefits, and thirdly, those in which some parties receive substantial benefits while others incur net losses. It is fully expected that the new undertaking will be of the first type, but all parties will gain substantially. One factor, however, may tend to influence public opinion in Tanganyika towards the view that the new undertaking will fall into the third category. I refer to the question of part of the import and export needs of the Northern and Lake Provinces being met through the port of Mombasa rather than through the ports of Tanga and Dar es Salaam. In fact, the unified railway will, except perhaps in times of stress, not be greatly interested in which route is used. The Territory, apart from the railway, has a considerable interest in moving the bulk or all of the traffic through Tanganyika and will be free, as it always has been, to take such action as is considered appropriate to safeguard the interests of the Territory. It may then be argued that any action by Government in this direction would be contrary to acceptance of the view that East Africa has an economic unity. Though the territories form a geographic and economic unity, they have varying forms of British administration. Tanganyika in particular is specifically required to safeguard the interests of its inhabitants and the Territory as a component of the East African unit is clearly entitled to take such action as appears necessary to safeguard its interests provided such actions are not detrimental to the interests of East Africa as a whole. … The diversion of traffic from Mombasa to Tanganyika ports would not appear to be detrimental to theEast African economy.” [1: 275-276]

Some objections to the proposal were placed and some amendments were tabled, an adjournment was also proposed. The British Government made it clear that amendments/adjournments would not be acceptable. That the objections on constitutional grounds had no merit. “The proposed amalgamation is, the Secretary of State has advised, entirely consistent with Article 5(b) of the Trusteeship Agreement which permits administering authorities to establish common services between Trust Territories and neighbouring territories under His Majesty’s control. The Secretary of State is confident that in carrying out their responsibilities the High Commission will be constantly aware of their duties to promote the economic interest of the inhabitants of Tanganyika. The Secretary of State adds that an efficient transport system is vital to all these interests, as indeed it will be to the benefit of the whole future of East Africa.” [1: p276-276]

The motion as tabled by Mr Farquharson was carried, as were similar motions in the Legislative Councils of Kenya and Uganda. An order was made on 1st May 1948 amalgamating the two separate companies into one transport system to be known as the ‘East African Railways and Harbours’. A Commissioner of Transport was appointed, Sir Reginald Robins, and in his first annual report he wrote:

“Much has been done in a short time towards achieving the main objective of amalgamation, i.e. to weld the transport system into one closely integrated homogeneous organisation designed to provide the maximum transport facilities for the people of East Africa at the lowest real cost and on a non-profit basis.

“There have been exchanges of views and methods by technical officers, designed to secure a standard of the best methods to be adopted. Assistance has been rendered where it is most required by drawing on the pool of experts created by amalgamation. Work has been started on the preparation of a common tariff and common conditions of service. Comprehensive Transport Legislation is in the course of preparation; transport developments in Tanganyika have been financed from the joint resources.

“But much remains to be done. The problems falling on the East African Railways and Harbours are immense, the resources limited. Great developments are taking place in Tanganyika, still greater developments there are contemplated with the posibility of surveying and building of new railways. Great developments are in hand in Uganda which will make heavy demands on the transport system in connection with the hydro-electric scheme at Jinja, and the possible development of the copper mines at Kilembe. Yet, as is shown in the General Manager’s report, the system is still short of sufficient equipment to deal adequately with present demands. The financial question is also a very serious one; all the fluid resources are being used and temporary borrowings incurred to finance existing projects, mainly in Tanganyika. There are restrictions and difficulties in raising fresh capital, yet daily fresh demands are made involving additional transport developments which cannot be financed from the existing resources of the Administration. If these restrictions and difficulties persist, there will be no alternative but to restrict some of the development projects in the three East African territories in spite of the demand for the full development of the Colonial Empire as a contribution to world recovery. In almost every development scheme transport is the key, and it is absolutely essential that the fitting of the transport system to deal with any development should precede the inauguration of the scheme and not to put the transport question last in such considerations, or even to develop the transport system at the same time as the major scheme. That will only lead to difficulties and failure. These arguments, which are related to finance, apply with equal force to the supply of transport equipment.

“Among the other problems which still remain to be settled are the introduction of a common braking system for the two sections, replacement of the present out-of-date coupler by a modern and stronger coupler, the provision of a rail connection between all sections of the amalgamated system, and decisions as to the conversion of the system from metre to 3 foot 6 inch gauge. For financial and supply reasons, some of these projects must be regarded as long-term projects, but, nevertheless, work is proceeding on them.

“Immense tasks face the Transport Administration. Immense tasks faced the two systems in the war, but they were met and overcome. The Commissioner is convinced that the present tasks will be met and overcome in the same spirit, provided that the tolerance, support and encouragement of the people who use the transport system are forthcoming. He is satisfied that the staff is as anxious as he is to provide the best possible transport system in East Africa, and he would like to pay a tribute to them for their loyalty and help during the difficult period of amalgamation. He also gratefully acknowledges the help and assistance he received from the Governments of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda.” [1: p278-279]

Hill’s narrative ends with the amalgamation. His book contains two Appendices which are included after the References and Notes below.

References and Notes

1. M.F. Hill; Permanent Way Volume II: The Story of the Tanganyika Railways; East African Railways and Habours, Nairobi, Kenya; Watson & Viney, Aylesbury & Slough, 1957.
2. David Snowden; Tanganyika Road Services; https://www.britishempire.co.uk/article/tanganyikaroadservices.htm#google_vignette, accessed on 1st June 2026.
3. Snowden writes: “In October 1940 the Tanganyika Government asked the Tanganyika Railways and Port Services (TR&PS) to run a road service between Morogoro on the Central Line and Korogwe on the Tanga Line, a distance of 178 miles. The TR&PS were asked to run this service because a lack of shipping and the irregularity of sailings meant that it was becoming increasingly difficult to move goods between Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam. ‘This has proved most successful,’ Mr Robins (General Manager) wrote, ‘and in view of the decrease of coastal shipping services has fulfilled a most useful function. The service became an integral part of the transport services at the end of the year. The rather primitive facilities will be improved as opportunity permits.’ … In 1942, a first class bus service, using a number of 7 -seater safari cars built on 10-cwt chassis, was introduced between Morogoro and Korogwe. The fares charged were double the normal second-class fare on the ordinary bus. This service proved extremely successful and by 1943 demand was so heavy, especially for carrying troops, that all ordinary goods traffic was diverted to the sea route between Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam – only passengers and baggage were carried by road. … In 1942 the TR&PS were asked by the Government to provide a road service from Dodoma to the Southern Highlands. This service was inaugurated on 1st January 1943. At the time there was a shortage of vehicles in Tanganyika and consequently the railways had to purchase second-hand vehicles. Many of them were in a bad state of repair, there was a shortage of spares, roads were bad, the drivers poorly trained and there was a lack of suitable workshop facilities for proper maintenance. Despite these difficulties, by 1944 the service was able to carry not only the normal traffic to and from the Southern Highlands but also large quantities of food for famine relief, labour to and from the sisal and rubber plantations and provide transport support for the refugee camps in the Southern Highlands. In 1944, a road service was started from Mombo to Lushoto, … During the years 1946 to 1948 the Road Services continued to operate under very difficult conditions with inadequate workshop facilities and unsuitable vehicles. Many of the vehicles had been bought during the war, had been worked hard and were in poor condition. Although in 1948 the Road Services’ fleet consisted of 250 assorted vehicles many had been fully depreciated and were waiting their turn to be scrapped. Despite these problems, the volume of traffic carried increased, rates were kept at a reasonable level and the revenue earned steadily increased. Orders were placed for large diesel-engine vehicles that later became the mainstay of the road service fleet. … During 1947, a new passenger road service was started between Arusha and Dodoma, a passenger and goods service between Arusha and Oldeani and when the Singida line was closed it was replaced by a road service between Singida and Itigi.” [2]
4. https://rogerfarnworth.com/2026/03/04/narrow-gauge-industrial-lines-in-tanganyika-tanzania.

Appendices

Appendix A – Financial Results of the Railways and Ports

Appendix B – Lists of Commodities Carried by Tanganyika Railways