The featured image shows the aftermath of one accident involving a London tramcar, © Evening Standard. [4]

Professional thinking in London in the early 1950s was that tramway modernisation would reduce road accidents. Accordingly, The Light Railway Transport League was invited to exhibit at a number of post-war Road Safety Exhibitions. [1: p59]

However, on 1st January 1954, a London Transport Executive press release carried the title ‘Tram Scrapping has reduced London accidents’. [2] This claim was based on a study “undertaken … by the Road Research Laboratory of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and summarised in a Report issued towards the end of [1953].” [3]

The Modern Tramway noted that the report was a serious well-intentioned piece of research into trends in London traffic accidents. It was “cautious in its approach and highly qualified in its conclusions.” [1: p59] However, the article continues, “the fact is that the parts of this Report, divorced from their contexts, which received notice in the Press appears to have given an incorrect impression, and this we point out lest students of transport fail to draw a proper distinction between the study itself and the conclusions drawn from it.” [1: p60]

This has often been a malaise which had affected public reporting of detailed technical papers. The LTE release chose to remove all qualifying statements and ignored the manifest caution in the way conclusions were expressed by the original report. It perhaps is also symptomatic of a general presumption that tramways (and also railways) were not the transport of the future. The internal combustion engine was seen as the future. At the time, this was not necessarily an unreasonable view. It has, however, been proven to be a significant miss-step in policy direction as the years have unfolded.

“The original accident study considered all London accidents from 1950 to 1952, and compared the general trend of all kinds of accidents with those on ex-tram routes; only if the ex-tram route reduction was significantly greater than the more general reduction could the greater reduction be associated with tram-scrapping. So far, so good. BUT of all the accident classes surveyed, only that of ‘Accidents involving public service vehicles’ was found to have a reduction which was statistically significant, and within this class, fatal accidents actually increased, serious accidents were not reduced significantly, and the much-vaunted reduction was, in fact, limited to ‘slight accidents involving public service vehicles’. The L.T.E. handout omitted all mention of this vitally important word ‘slight’ and … gave the same statistical weight to all … classes of accident.” [1: p60]

Surely, one fatal accident is more concern to the community than fifty ‘slight’ accidents, “and the Report confirms the views of the Road Safety Organiser for Greenwich that by disciplining other traffic, London’s trams did at least keep the proportion of fatal or serious accidents well below the average for the whole country. It may well be that in this way, and by the tendency of the tram’s life- guard to reduce the proportion of fatalities in accidents, the tram has saved many valuable lives.” [1: p60]

The Modern Tramway comments that, “the over-simplification of this theme in the L.T.E. handout is the more regrettable in view of the fact that the London Transport Executive were the sole agency through which the results of the study were made public. A different body with no direct interest in the justification of tramway abandonments might have presented the results in a totally different way.” [1: p60]

Perhaps of even greater significance in that contemporary debate was the way in which the different transport authorities and borough councils had created a context in which tramway accidents were more likely to occur. “For eighteen years, every suggestion that would have reduced accidents was turned down on the excuse that the trams were to be scrapped, and dozens of urgently needed road improvement works were held up on the excuse that they must await the final abandonment; no wonder acci- dents happened.” [1: p60]

The Modern Tramway highlighted a number of issues/examples which are worthy of note:

1. Many tram stops in South London desperately needed to be equipped with loading islands but, except in two isolated instances, nothing was done, even where the road was sufficiently wide to leave room for two lines of traffic between the island and the kerb.
2. On 11th March 1948, Croydon Highways Committee, acting on the recommendation of their Accident Prevention Sub-Committee and with the approval of the local police, asked London Transport to lay a double tram track through the bottleneck at Crown Hill, Croydon, in place of the single track. This proposal … was rejected.
3. As part of the general determination not to spend money on the tramways, the headlamps of London’s trams remained obscured until the end by their wartime masks. In most other towns trams would long since have been fitted with separate rear lights, and sometimes also with stop lights and indicators.
4. The same excuse of eventual abandonment was given when complaints were made about the type of tramway paving adopted, yet when the new lines were constructed in Lambeth for the Festival of Britain it was shown that even conduit tracks could be given a surrounding surface equal to that of the best modern roads.
5. The cars themselves, although efficient and extremely reliable vehicles, were not always maintained to the best possible standards; this is shown by the fact that in 1947 the men of Telford Avenue Depot actually staged a one-day strike to draw the attention of the public to the state of the vehicles which they were expected to drive. It is also significant that the Ministry of Transport would not allow the sale of ex-L.C.C. cars to other cities unless the braking systems were improved.

The consequences of the LTE’s shoddy approach to the dissemination of the report’s findings were also of significance. The Modern Tramway continues:

“Wherever tramways are the subject of Press attacks, the London figures were triumphantly reproduced with a “We told you so” air, often omitting the fact that only accidents involving public service vehicles were concerned and thus making it appear that tramway abandonment reduced all road accidents by a third, which is sheer nonsense. Other papers such as the Yorkshire Evening News developed their own patent theories as to the probable effect of tram-scrapping in their own areas, consequently, ignoring the different conditions. We have not forgotten how this newspaper treated two accidents in Leeds on 10th December, 1953, when the fact that a tram had grazed the side of a lorry, injuring no one, was reported with headline while the case of a 12-year-old girl knocked down by a bus on the same day was relegated to a small paragraph.” [1: p61]

The Report itself extrapolated its own findings, suggesting that if the effects in other towns were the same as in London, then the replacement of all the remaining tram services in Great Britain would result in a further saving of about 1,100 accidents per year. “In fact,” says The Modern Tramway, “any tramway officer outside London would have pointed out … that this gratuitious extrapolation is quite pointless.” [1: p61]

The Modern Tramway went on to point out some of the key distinctions: [1: p61-62]

• London tramways, for the most part, retained the outmoded conduit system of current collection, with a central slot and broken road surface. Except on the semi-reserved Embankment area lines, no one would have recommended its retention had the tramways been modernised.
• London tramways were almost completely devoid of reserved tracks, loading islands, and other modern aids to tramway safety. Where tramways on reserved tracks were replaced by buses running on the public highway, the opposite effect has been the case, and accidents had increased.
• The use of modern vehicles and well maintained tracks in other locations invalidates any comparison.
• In London, motorists were permitted to overtake stationary tramcars. Elsewhere this was usually prohibited by local bye-laws.
• In London, buses and trams shared the same road space. Elsewhere, they were kept on separate roads wherever possible.
• London’s trams relied on a magnetic brake, elsewhere, by 1953, air brakes were in use.

Experience in Sheffield and in a number of German towns suggests that the findings of the report about London were not replicated. In those cases “accident figures had risen as a result of tramway abandonment.” [1: p62]

The Modern Tramway concludes it article with two further thoughts:

1. Prior to the period examined by the Report, a considerable proportion of the public service vehicles involved in accidents would have been buses and coaches. The article states: “In our experience, a mixed service of buses and trams running along the same road is far more obstructive and dangerous than an equivalent service of one type of vehicle only; in these circumstances the replacement of the trams by extra buses may well result in fewer accidents, but exactly the same effect would be obtained by replacing the buses by extra trams. We understand that this is the case in Brussels, where several pre-war bus routes are now tram-worked and of 14 bus routes in 1939, only three now remain.” [1: p62]
2. “All public service assessments, “the article continues, “should be made, not on a ‘per vehicle’ basis, but on the basis of per unit service to the public. Since it is acknowledged that the replacing bus service is 5-10% less than the corresponding tram service, it follows that there are roughly 73% fewer vehicles, and each has 56 rather than 73 seats, ie., there are 29% fewer replacing seats – and it is seats, on road public service vehicles, which represent service to the public. Assuming, however, that a third of the public service vehicles operating along tram-served roads were buses, there were still 20% fewer public service seats available along ex-tram routes after the scrapping of the trams. If it further be assumed that proportionality might be the criterion for accident assessment, a decrease of 20% in accidents might be permitted before significance is attached to the type of vehicle providing the service; after all, a 20% reduction in tram service might well have produced a 20% reduction in accidents involving trams. The actual decrease in accidents was nearly 30%, so it remains to be tested whether the unexpected extra reduction of 10% was significant in the light of the total number of such accidents.” [1: p62]

In fact, performing a “chi-square” test of significance with the revised figures, in the light of the service provided, showed that any reduction in accident numbers was no longer statistically significant.

The Modern Transport article concluded firstly that London Transport and the Press made far too much of a Report in which its D.S.I.R. authors qualified their conclusions very heavily. And insisted that the observed decrease in accidents is only in ‘slight’ accidents with other accident numbers not having changed appreciably.

It seems to me that there is a salutary lesson here for us all which relates to the need to treat press reports with care particularly where those publishing press releases about those reports may have their own agenda.

References

1. Trams and Road Accidents: A Fresh London Analysis; The Modern Tramway, Volume 17, No. 196, April 1954.
2. Tram Scrapping Has Reduced London Accidents; LTE Press Office, G.P.N. 257, 1st January 1954.
3. DSIR Road Research Laboratory Report R.N. 2061, October 1953. … It is worth noting that the report was not released to public scrutiny but that its substance appeared in reports within the technical press of the time.
4. https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/historic-london-when-trams-and-trolleybuses-ruled-the-capital-s-roads-a2923361.html, accessed on 15th June 2023.