Reading the ‘Modern Tramway’ Journal of May 1983 in Autumn 2023, took me back to the time when I was working for Greater Manchester Council. The County Engineer was A.E. Naylor. I was working in the Engineer’s office in County Hall.
The ‘Modern Tramway’ carried an article by W.J. Wyse about the then recently released rail strategy for the conurbation. [1]
The report was released on 18th February 1983 and summarised the results of six months’ work by BR, the Greater Manchester Council (GMC) and the Greater Manchester PTE, assisted by consultants, ‘to develop an achievable long-term strategy for the maintenance and development of the local rail network, having regard to the likely development of the Intercity network’. It was a report which first made clear intentions for the building of a new ‘tram’-network for Greater Manchester.
Wyse writes:
“From the BR side, there was the important objective of improving Intercity services, so that these need no longer terminate at Manchester. An obvious example of such improvements would be to permit Anglo- Scottish expresses to run from London to Manchester on their way to Preston. The “Picc-Vic” scheme of the early 1970s had had to be abandoned because resources were not available. A later proposal for a low-cost Castlefield curve would have given only limited benefits in terms of improved central area access. Then, in 1980, BR published its proposals for the Windsor Link in Salford which, also using the link via Deansgate and Oxford Road, would enable through running between several interurban and local services. Coupled with the proposed Blackpool-Preston-Manchester electrification, this would also improve access to many Intercity services. Further improvements would follow from the Hazel Grove Chord, linking Hazel Grove with New Mills Central, to give better Intercity services to Sheffield.
The desire to improve the BR facilities in Manchester obviously brought up the possibility of electrifying the existing local rail system at 25 kV, coupling this with converting the 1500-volt lines to Hadfield and Glossop and the 1200-volt third-rail line to Bury all to 25 kV overhead supply. The problem here is that this would be a very expensive solution, so other strategies were considered and compared.
The current rail situation has five distinct areas which create problems that have to be solved in order to improve services. Some of these have already been mentioned, but setting them out in this way shows them in perspective.
1) Rolling stock obsolescence, especially of diesel railcar units.
2) Re-equipment of non-standard electric services now using de supply.
3) Renewal of obsolete signalling systems.
4) Separate north and south suburban railway networks, with lack of links and lack of penetration into and across central Manchester, making rail travel less attractive.
5) Two main Intercity stations, Piccadilly and Victoria, too far apart for easy interchange, and causing duplication of to be abandoned because resources were not facilities.
The GMC has committed itself to maintain the present basic pattern of rail services, and to improve the network to increase the use made of it. This includes better access to existing stations as well as possible new stations, and putting pressure on the government to authorise construction of new class-141 diesel railcar rolling stock.” [1: p146]
The Report proposed a number of alternative strategies.
BR’s intention to focus its Intercity services at Manchester Piccadilly retaining Victoria for provincial interurban and local services was made clear. This would mean a basic framework of Intercity services to Crewe, Macclesfield, Leeds, Preston and Liverpool, and beyond. Other interurban lines would serve Warrington, Chester and Bradford. These main programmes would then govern the re-equipment policies for the local services on these lines.
The rail strategy study concentrated on the lines which carry only local services, and indirect access into and across central Manchester.
The two main options were:
1) a comprehensive system of cross-city rail tunnels with electrification of the whole regional system to 25-kV mainline standards with ‘conventional’ rolling stock; or
2) non-conventional solutions using existing rail routes and a former rail route (to Charlton and Didsbury) with vehicles that could run on existing streets or in tunnels across the city centre to provide a comprehensive network that also would also allow for interchange with the Intercity network.
That second option was then further subdivided into two:
2a) a Light Rail Rapid Transit system using vehicle which were defined as “a cross between a rail vehicle and a tram”; and
2b) replacement of rail tracks by carriageways on which some form of express bus would run.
It was noted that (2b) might create problems for existing and proposed goods facilities.
The conventional rail solution would have meant a rail tunnel between Piccadilly and Victoria Stations with an intermediate stop at Piccadilly Gardens. Another tunnel would have run East-West, connecting the Altrincham line with the Piccadilly line with an intermediate station at Albert Square No reinstatement of the Chrolton-Didsbury line was included.
The non-conventional solutions would have to meet certain criteria:
“i) segregation from the conventional rail network except for grade crossings with limited movement of goods;
ii) routes compatible with development of the conventional rail network;
iii) existing or potential traffic must be sufficient; and
iv) the routes must make a logical network and, for the corridors they serve, give adequate interchange with the main BR network.
These criteria would be satisfied by the following lines; Bury, Rochdale via Oldham, Glossop/Hadfield, Marple/Rose Hill (assuming building of the Hazel Grove chord), Altrincham (with Chester services diverted via Stockport), and the former Midland line to Didsbury.
Interchange with conventional Intercity and local rail services would be given at Victoria, Piccadilly and Deansgate/Central stations. The cross-city routes would meet at Piccadilly Gardens with the equivalent of a triangular junction to provide good access to what they call “the core of the Regional Centre” by all permutations of through-running across the junction.
The routes for the surface link in the city centre [had] been worked out to minimise conflicts with general traffic; apart from the section between Piccadilly Gardens and High Street, the lines would not run through high pedestrian-activity areas. These routes, as shown in the map, have been worked out for a Light Rail solution, but the report indicates that they could be modified for a busway solution.
Alternatives to LRT that were considered include road-based systems (buses and trolleybuses) and dual-mode systems including busways on existing rail formations. The only systems they felt worth considering [were]: LRT, busways and guided buses. [1: p148]
The possible LRT system would require lower standards (in terms of alignment, stations, signalling and vehicle weight) than conventional rail systems. They would be able to run on streets and use existing rail routes at relatively minimal cost. This made them very attractive. Their capacity was stated as between 1,000 and 5,000 passengers per hour, with up to 10,000 in central areas. It was noted that phased development would be possible and that boarding and alighting might well be at close to normal pavement level.
Wyse continues:
“Changes would be needed to the proposed new layout of Piccadilly Gardens, and a number of changes to the road layout to accommodate LRT would have to balance the needs of LRT against other vehicles and pedestrians. An important change of attitude from the more usual approach is the opinion that installation of LRT need not lead to any significant decline in environmental standards, especially if overhead wires can be supported from wires attached to buildings rather than poles.
An LRT system could be extended on to other existing or former rail routes, or considered for other corridors where the roads are wide enough to allow construction. Indeed the wheel [had] now turned full circle, for the LRT could be extended “on-highway, right into the middle of major district centres”, in other words, as a conventional tramway. …
Both busway solutions [were] not … studied in the same detail as LRT solutions. They would require significantly higher capital expenditure for carriageways to replace existing rail tracks on some 90% of the proposed system, but only indicative costs [were] worked out for a carriageway width of 8 m with hard shoulders of 2.5 m. Whilst a guided busway would avoid the need for hard shoulders, there [were] issues of operational reliability and ‘on street’ use. A busway that [could] run on street without extra works or hardware could have advantages over LRT, and feeder services at the outer ends could also use existing roads. Further work would [have been] needed to establish whether capital costs could be reduced without sacrificing the operational and safety aspects. [1: p148-149]
A Comparison of Costs
As can be seen in Table 1, LRT at surface level is the cheapest estimate by some margin. The report also considered what might be the costs of a first phase of work:
- Re-electrifying the Bury line and constructing the Victoria-Piccadilly tunnel – £95 million;
- LRT above ground – converting the Bury and Altrincham lines and building the complete city centre network – £38.5 million
- LRT city centre network in tunnel, otherwise as the above ground scheme – £56.5 million.
Apparently, no work had yet been done “on assessing the operating costs of the alternative strategies, or on considering the effects of bus operating strategies. … While no assessment [had] been made of the benefits to passengers and the effects on other road users, all options [were] considered likely to give significant benefits compared with the ‘Do Nothing’ alternative.” [1: p149]
Cost comparisons were made with the Tyne & Wear and the London Docklands schemes with figures adjusted to November 1982 levels. Table 2 shows these prices.
Wyse commented that work so far undertaken indicated “that if the present rail network [was] to be retained, an LRT system using existing rail lines which do not carry BR interurban services would appear to offer a significantly cheaper solution than conventional heavy rail and ‘busway’ solutions.” [1: p150]
He also noted that, “Further work [was] needed to consider both the operating costs of the alternatives, with due allowance for revisions to bus services, and the likely order of benefits. … Aspects which need[ed] early consideration include[d]: confirmation of the feasibility of city centre LRT tunnels, the safeguarding of potential LRT and busway routes and facilities, the organisation and management of an LRT or busway system (a joint BR/PTE set up [was] suggested), and finally the opportunities to provide improved cross-conurbation services and connexions to Intercity services for major district centres such as Ashton-under-Lyne.” [1: p150]
Manchester’s Network in 2023
40 years on from thi9s report it is interesting to note how much of what was planned came to fruition. As we know the high cost solution of tunnelling under the city centre was not developed. A Light Rapid Transit solution was given the go-ahead and has met much of what was intended.
The network map can be found here [2].
The first line constructed was the Altrincham to Bury line through Victoria Station and the centre of the city. A link to Piccadilly Station was also installed in the early years. The following history is gleaned from Wikipedia [3].
Phase I opened in 1992. The original Market Street tram stop handled trams to Bury, with High Street tram stop handling trams from Bury. When Market Street was pedestrianised, High Street stop was closed, and Market Street stop was rebuilt to handle trams in both directions, opening in its new form in 1998.
Shudehill Interchange opened between Victoria station and Market Street in April 2003. The bus station complementing it opened on 29 January 2006.
Phase 2 provided a link with Salford Quays with a line running to Eccles. Cornbrook tram stop was opened in 1995 on the Altrincham line to provide an interchange with the new line to Eccles. There was initially no public access from the street, but this changed on 3 September 2005 when the original fire exit was opened as a public access route.
Two of the original stops; Mosley Street, and Woodlands Road were closed in 2013. The latter being replaced by two new stops (Abraham Moss and Queens Road) opened nearby.
By the mid-2000s, most of the track on the Bury and Altrincham routes was 40+ years old and in need of replacement. In 2006 it was decided that a £107 million programme to replace this worn track would take place in 2007.
Phase 3 entailed a significant expansion of the network. It turned into a series of different phases as different funding arrangements had to be made:
Phase 3a – created four new lines along key transport corridors in Greater Manchester: the Oldham and Rochdale Line (routed northeast to Oldham and Rochdale), the East Manchester Line (routed east to East Manchester and eventually to Ashton-under-Lyne), the South Manchester Line (routed southeast to Chorlton-cum-Hardy and eventually to East Didsbury), and eventually the Airport Line (routed south to Wythenshawe and Manchester Airport). A spur was also added to the network to link from the Eccles line to Media City. The link to Media City was opened in 2010. The Line to Chorlton opened in 2011. The other lines opened gradually between 2011 and 2013.
Phase 3b – Three lines mentioned in the paragraph above were extended from initially shorter lines. The construction of the East Manchester line extension from Droylsden to Ashton-under-Lyne, the East Didsbury extension from Chorlton and the Airport line via Wythenshawe, commenced in 2011 and all was complete by the end of 2014.
Phase 2CC – Second City Centre Crossing – was completed in 2017.
Trafford Park [4] – The Trafford Park line linked the Trafford Centre to the network and opened in 2020.
References
- W.J. Wyse; A Rail Strategy for Greater Manchester; in Modern Tramway and Light Rail Transit, Volume 48 No. 545; Light Rail Transit Association and Ian Allan, Shepperton, London; May 1983, p146-150.
- https://images.ctfassets.net/nv7y93idf4jq/4RsbFDfzF2zVYfE67Njh8H/0018c0020be875e86e41b04e940433ab/23-0483_Metrolink_Map_-_Sept_2023.svg, accessed on 11th October 2023.
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Manchester_Metrolink, accessed on 11th October 2023. The featured image comes from this Wikipedia article.
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trafford_Park_Line, accessed on 11th October 2023.
- https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/02/manchester-metrolink-line-opens-ahead-schedule, accessed on 11th October 2023.
Roger Farnworth 
